Introduction
In mathematics, a consequence drawn by a deduction from a set of premises can also drawn by the same deduction from any larger set of premises. The deduction remains a deduction no matter how the axioms are increased. This is monotonic reasoning, much imitated in other, less certain, disciplines. The very nature of monotonic reasoning makes mathematical proofs permanent, independent of new information. Thus it has been since Euclid and Aristotle. Theorems with complete proofs are never withdrawn due to later knowledge. It is little exaggeration to say that mathematicians never reject the completed proofs of their predecessors, except to complain about their constructivity.
Mathematicians build directly on the works of their forebearers stretching back two and a half millenia to Euclid. Our current mathematical reasoning is merely a fleshed-out version of Euclid's. Monotonic reasoning marks theoretical mathematics as a discipline. The traditional systems of mathematical logic are monotonic since they simple reflect mathematical usage. Tarski [1956] described a calculus of deductive systems and captured in a simple way the general concept of a monotonic formal system. His formulation includes all logics traditionally studied, intuitionistic, modal, and classical. He did not qualify his definition, as we do, with the adjective "monotone," because there were no other systems studied at that time.
Minsky [1975] suggested that there is another sort of reasoning which is not monotonic. This is reasoning in which we deduce a statement based on the absence of any evidence against the statement. Such a statement is in the category of beliefs rather than in the category of truths. Modern science offers as a tool for establishing provisional beliefs statistics, but in many instances we have no basis for applying statistics, due to a lack of governing distributions or samples for the problem at hand.
What role does belief play in our affairs? Often we must make sharp "yes or no" decisions between alternative actions. There may be no deductive or statistical base which justifies our choice, but we may not be able to wait for missing information, it may never materialize anyway. Often all we have as a basis for decision is surmise; that is, deductions from beliefs as well as truths and statistically derived statements. These beliefs are often accepted and used as premises for deduction and choice of action due to an unquantified lack of evidence against them.
A philosopher's much-quoted example is about Tweety. We observe only birds that can fly, and accept the belief that all birds can fly from the absence of evidence for the existence of non-flying birds. We are told that Tweety is a bird, and conclude that Tweety can't fly using our belief as premise. Later, we observe that Tweety is a pet ostrich and clearly can't fly. We reject our previous belief set and conclusions as a basis for decision making, and are forced to choose a new belief set. The new set of beliefs may also include equally uncertain statements, accepted due to a lack of evidence against. But we blithly draw consequences from the new belief set and make decisions on that basis till contrary evidence on some accepted belief is garnered, at which time we again have to acquire a new set of beliefs.
This has happened in the history of practically every subject except mathematics. The principles of physics, or biology, have been changed with every scientific revolution, even though unreflective practitioners of each age think that final principles have been found. Even for mathematics, the Dutch mathematician and philosopher L.E.J. Brouwer would have argued that the belief in theorems established by "nonconstructive methods" was unjustified, and that a new belief set based on constructive principles should be adopted in its place. Other mainstream mathematicians such as Hilbert did not agree with this position. Some philosophers of mathematics living now would argue that, even within classical mathematics, the independence proofs for propositions of set theory, such as the continuum hypothesis or the axiom of choice, indicate there are several incompatible axiomatic systems which, as belief sets, could be the foundation of mathematics.
One can envisage making up non-monotone logics describing the mathematical nature of belief. The exact result depends on the definition chosen for "lack of evidence against". McCarthy [1980] , initiated the study of non-monotonicity with his notion of circumscription. With all relation symbols but one, R, of a model (the worl! we are discussing) held fixed, and given axioms p(R) relating that R to the other (fixed) relations of the model, the belief should be that, lacking further evidence to the contrary, we should posit that R denotes the least relation R, if any, satisfying cp(R). If further evidence in the form of an axiom $ (R) becomes available, then we should believe that R denotes the least R satisfying (vA$)(R), if any, instead, in a changed belief set.
There are now many different non-monotonic system, abstracted from different questions in computer science and AI. Among the other systems that have been studied are The theory of multiple believers of Hintikka, [1962] .
Truth Maintenance systems of Doyle, [1979] Default logic of Reiter, [1980] Autoepistemic logic of Moore, [1985] Theory of individual and common knowledge and belief of Halpern and Moses [1984] Logic programming with negation as failure This, by no means, exhausts the list. What issues in artificial intelligence or computer science motivates these systems?
Suppose that we build a robot in a "blocks world" to navigate in a room and avoid obstacles and perform simple tasks, such as crossing the room with variable obstacles. We want the robot to learn principles from experience as to how to cross the room. At any given point, one may imagine that the robot should have a consistent deductively closed set of beliefs which are the current basis for its actions, including such provisional beliefs as "I can always traverse the left edge of the room since there has never been anything in the way there". But when such a principle is contradicted by new obstacles, the robot has to choose another belief set. So an important problem is to define what a belief set is and how to compute them and how to update them based on new evidence. Moore's autoepistemic logic [1985] , is really a first try at this problem, mostly for propositional logic.
In computers, the operating system and program obey rules which compute how to change state. In the absence of exceptional behaviour, such as error conditions or failures to access resources, there is a system of decision rules (beliefs) computing how to change the state of the machine in this "normal behavior", or "default" case. But when an exceptional behavior happens, we are thrown to a different set of decision rules for change of state, a different set of "beliefs". One wants to be able to deduce what is true of the machine in states when it is a particular such "belief set". A logic for dealing with one such belief set at a time is Reiter's default logic.
In databases, facts and rules are stored as entries (the PROLOG model). Often also the database computes and stores conclusions, such as summary statistics or rules or tables computed from the database. These act as a deductive base for the set of current beliefs. When we query the database, we are asking for consequences of this belief set. When we update the database, all old entries that have changed have to be replaced, every consequence that uses these entries has to be recomputed and changed too. This is the process of replacing an old belief set by a new one. One often makes decisions on the basis of the absence of information in the database as well. A logic appropriate for describing a single such belief set is Doyle's truth-maintenance system [1979] . See also de Kleer [1986] . Also stable models for logic programming with negation as failure ( [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 19881) arise in this way.
We expressed these examples informally in terms of the anthropomorphic notion of belief so as to bring out their common features. The actual non-monotonic logics have much in common, and a number of translations between them have been proposed ([Konolige, 19881, [Gelfond and Przymusiriska, 1986] , [Gelfond and Przymusiriska, 19891, [Reinfrank and Dressler, 1989] , [Marek and Truszczyhki, 19891) . They have been investigated principally for propositional logic. Predicate versions suitable for actual applications are, up to now, pretty minimal.
Study of monotonic rule systems can be traced to the work of Post on "production systems" and to work of Tarski on the abstract properties of consequence relation for classical logic systems. The investigation of nonmonotonic component is of much more recent nature and seems to appear first in the work of Reiter on default logic. Reiter's investigations involved finding a natural extension of classical logic which allows one to handle the negative information.
Independently Clark, and subsequently Apt, Blair and Walker, and also (extending their work) Gelfond and Lifschitz, studied "negation as failure" in logic programming. It has turned out that these investigations are in a common direction. The mutual relations were uncovered by Bidoit and Froidevaux and Marek and Truszczynski, who exhibited the precise nature of the connection between logic programming and default logic. The reevaluation of default extensions in terms of "context-dependent proofs" by Marek and Truszczynski, which has its roots in the Apt, Blair and Walker's "elementary interpreter", for which it may serve as a clarifying definition, is a point of departure for the investigations of this paper. Here, drawing on all the research mentioned above for inspiration, we present a coherent unified theory of nonmonotonic formal systems.
At our level of abstraction we finally saw that non-monotone systems pervade ordinary mathematical practice. There is no sign of any realization of the existence of such mathematical examples in the previous non-monotonic logic literature. Perhaps these connections can only be seen by having a common abstract notion. What this commonality does for us is to make available known mathematical techniques from other areas of conventional mathematics for constructing and classifying belief sets (extensions), and simultaneously make evident a common thread among disparate parts of mathematics and disparate non-monotonic systems from artificial intelligence and computer science.
On the level of Mathematical Philosophy there is a connection worth stating as well. Non-monotone reasoning takes place during the process of discovery of mathematical theorems, when one posits temporarily some proposition on the basis that there is no evidence against it, and explores the consequences of such a belief until new mathematical facts force their abandonment. These non-monotone belief sets have their traces eradicated when final belief sets are achieved and demonstrative proofs are finished and published. The only hint of provisional belief sets left in mathematical papers is in the motivational remarks explaining what obstacles were overcome and by what changes in viewpoint the proof was achieved.
Here is the main definition. A non-monotone rule system consists of a set U and a set of triples ( a , p, 7) called rules, where a = ( a l , . . .,ak) is a finite sequence of elements of U , called premises, p = (PI,. . . , P I ) is a finite sequence of elements from U , called guards, and 7 is an element of U . This is written, generalizing a notation of default logic, as a1 . . . , a n : P l , . . . ,pk
7
The informal reading is: From a1, . . . , being established, and P I , . . . , P k not being established now or ever, conclude 7. You may substitute "computed" for "established" for an informal reading in many applications. A subset S of U is called deductively closed if for every rule of the system, whenever 0 1 , . . . , ak are in S and P I , . . . ,Pn are not in S , then y is in S.
There are no variables here, these are not schema, this version is not the one appropriate for non-monotone predicate logics. Nonmonotonic predicate logics cannot be exposited in a few lines and we defer that to a later paper.
The intersection of all deductively closed sets containing a set I is generally not deductively closed. But the intersection of a descending chain of deductively closed sets is deductively closed, and Z may be contained in many minimal deductively closed sets over I . In the context of nonmonotone logic the intersection of all deductively closed sets containing I is a (non-deductively closed) set, called the the set of secure consequences of I . These are the propositions a "skeptical reasoner" would take as beliefs based on I . The most important notion of contemporary nonmonotonic logic is that of extension. For a fixed subset S of U , one defines (finite) derivations from I , where all guards encountered are outside S , all premises encountered are conclusions of previous rules or in I . This defines the set Cs(Z) of S-consequences of I . Extensions are those S such that S = C s ( I ) . These are minimal deductively closed sets containing I , but not conversely. These represent the "deductively closed, grounded, belief sets" that contain I . In these sets, if the negative guards are all obeyed, we are reduced to monotone reasoning. See Section 2 for the exact definition.
These simple definitions capture the common content of the several theories of non-monotonicity listed above, and of many mathematical theories as well. For example, the set of all marriages of the "marriageproblem" can be formulated as exactly the set of all extensions in a non-monotone rule system; similarly for the set of all k-colorings of graphs, the set of chain covers of a partial order, the Stone space of all maximal ideals of a Boolean algebra, etc. Similarly, for a commutative ring with unit there is a non-monotone rule system such that the deductively closed sets are the prime ideals, the McCoy radical (the set of nilpotents) is the set of secured consequences of {0}, etc. There are similar non-monotonic systems associated with virtually every algebraic systremn for which radicals of some sort have been defined and characterized. These mathematical examples have suggested a whole new set of techniques for finding extensions because of the availability of algorithms already investigated in the mathematical literature on one or another of these problems, not previously known to be relevant in the artificial intelligence community. They not arise in logic, but really in operations research. Finally, in recursion theory, prioric constructions can be construed as non-monotone systems, sets constructed by the priority argument as extensions. These ideas give many constructions of recursively enumerable extensions.
We spend a lot of effort in both this and subse-quent papers to answer the following question. Exactly how complicated is the set of extensions of a recursively enumerable nonmonotonic system, and what is its structure? This is the analogue of the classical logic question, how complicated is the set of complete theories containing a recursively enumerable theory, and what is its structure? In classical logic, this leads to analyzing the character of the set of maximal ideals containing given recursively enumerable ideal in a recursively presented free Boolean Algebra, a subject in which two of the authors have a lot of experience (see [Remmel, 19891, [Nerode and Remmel, 19851) . The simplest case covering many nonmonotonic systems arising from mathematics is that of "highly recursive" nonmonotone rule systems. There, it turns out that extensions can be, up to a one-to-one recursive map, exactly any bounded II? class os sets of natural numbers. So, even in this case, the computational problems are of the same level of difficulty as (say) 1990] . Since this is a more delicate matter than recursion theory, these developments are deferred again to a later paper.
Next, we turn to investigations of the semantics for nonmonotonic rule systems. The fundamental common semantics we have found comes from L,,,, and generalizes the Clark completion of logic programming. It is perfectly general, and gives systematic semantics and completeness for all the nonmonotonic logics discussed above. Such uniform semantics are new. Some of the subjects never before had a decent semantics. We find semantical representations of extensions, weak extensions and deductively closed sets. This representation requires creation of an additional infinitary language Cs which properly encodes not only rules as "first order objects", but also additional (infinitary) objects allowing characterization of the intended structures (extensions, weak extensions etc.). The previously established characterization of default logic, in terms of nonmonotonic rule systems, provides us with a semantics for default logic. This semantics, in opposition to the attempt of Etherington, satisfies Tarski's conditions. That is, it allows us to introduce for defaults (virtual) negations, conjunctions etc, and also a natural entailment relation. Finally, the L,,,, proof procedures also yield new algorithms based on recursive well-founded trees.
This short summary indicates that there is a great wealth of problems and results which naturally arise from nonmonotonic rule systems. Our study delineates the role of (parametized) deducibility in nonmonotonic logics. This, in turn, connects our work naturally with studies of inductive definability. The latter indicates that logic programming will profit by less emphasis on predicate calculus, and more emphasis on inductive definability. Although this is a paradigm different from Kowalski's, we do not claim that this is the only "correct" position. But we do claim that it leads to a new direction for research.
The predicate logic case is not treated in this p a per. It will come out from a schematic version of our theory, analogous to Post production systems. There, U is the set of all strings of an alphabet. There are typed "metavariables" ranging over specific subsets of U called "types", there are "metastrings". These are built from the alphabet of U and string variables, as sequence of elements of U and variables. Rules are of the same form as before, but use metastrings instead of strings. This point of view gives rise not only to a general theory, but also gives outright syntax, semantics, and completeness for new predicate versions of all the logics mentioned above. It also gives nonmonotone classical, or intuitionistic, or modal predicate and propositional logics. Either, or both, lists P , G may be empty. If P = G = 8 then the rule r is called an axiom.
Nonmonotonic formal systems
A nonmonotonic formal system is a pair < U, N >,
where U is a non-empty set and N is a set of nonmonotonic rules.
A monotonic formal system is a nonmonotonic system in which each rule has no guards. That is, each monotonic formal system can be identified with the nonmonotonic system in which every monotonic rule is given an empty set of guards.
A subset S E U is called deductively closed if for every rule of N , if all premises a1, . . . , a, are in S and all guards PI, . . . , flm are not in S then the conclusion 'p belongs to S. Example 2.1, (b) shows that the set of all secured consequences is not, in general, deductively closed.
U, an S-deduction of 'p from I in < U , N > is a finite sequence < ( P I , . . . , 'pk > such that (pk = cp and, for all i 5 k , and each (pi is in I or is an axiom, or is the conclusion of a rule r E N such that all the premises of r are included in , . . . , (pi-1) and all guards of r are in U \ S (see v1 Marek and Truszczyriski, 19891, also [Reinfrank and Dressler, 19891 ).
An S-consequence of I is an element of U occurring in some S-deduction from I . Let Cs(I) be the set of all S-consequences of I in < U , N >.
Generally, C s ( I ) is not deductively closed in < U , N >. It is perfectly possible that all premises of a rule are in Cs(I), the guards of that rule are outside Cs(I), but a guard of that rule is in S, preventing the conclusion from being put into CS( I ) . However, the following holds:
We say that S E U is grounded in I if S
We say that S Finally, we say thatS C U is a weak extension of I if
C s ( I ) . U is an extension of I if C s ( I ) = S .
Cs(1 U R) = s, where R = {cp: for Some r E N , r = al~"'~an:P1~'.'#m, a1 ,..., a, E S,pl ,..., pm 4 S } Thus S is a weak extension if S is generated by I and the conclusions of rules that are applicable. The notion of weak extension is related to Clark's completion and will be investigated below. The notion of groundedness is related to the phenomenon called "reconstruction". S is grounded in I if all elements of S are S-deducible from I (remember that S influences only the negative side of the rule). S is an extension of I if two things happen. First of all, every element of S is deducible from I , that is, S is grounded in I (this is analogue of adequacy).
Second, the converse holds: all the S-consequences of I belong to S (this is analogue of completeness). Thus extensions are analogues for a nonmonotonic systems of the set of all consequences for monotonic systems. Both properties (adequacy and completeness) need to be satisfied. The third concept, weak extension, is a closure property. In the process of constructing Cs(I), S is used to generate only negatively as a restraint. But we can relax our requirements and allow deductions that use S also on the positive side. That is, S is not included, but is allowed to be used to generate objects from U by also testing the positive side of a rule for membership in S. This concept is closely related with the fixpoints of the operator T p in logic programming, and Clark's completion, see The notion of extension is related to that of minimal deductively closed set.
Lemma 2.2
If S is an extension of I , then: ( I ) S is a minimal deductively closed superset of I.
(2) For every I' such that I g I' g S , Cs(I') = S . With a nonmonotonic system S = < U , N > we associate the operator T = T s : P ( V ) -+ ? ( U ) defined by formulaTs(I) = {'p E U : jrENr = --, a n : P 1~. . . l P m , Deductively closed sets here play the role that Herbrand models play in logic programming, Weak extensions play a role similar to that of supported models of programs, that is, models of Clark's completion, in logic programming. (see also Section 6).
S is called a prefixpoint of T . There is no guarantee that T possesses a fixpoint.
Corollary 2.7 For every system < U , N >, for every S U which is a prefixpoint of T , there is a minimal prefixpoint S' of T , S' c S.

A set S such that T ( S )
With each rule r we associate a monotonic rule 
( S ) .
The projection < U , N >IS is the monotone system 
Classical Implicational Propositional Logic
Here the set U is the collection of all well-formed formulas of propositional logic, over some collection At of atoms with binary connective a and constant 1. The standard Lukasiewicz axiomatization is represented as a collection of rules of the form:
The collection of derivable elements of U is the set of tautologies of propositional logic.
Propositional logic may be represented in other ways as well, for instance in the language with the usual connectives 7, A, V, j . [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 19881 for the definition of a stable model of such a program. That concept is a generalization of the perfect models as introduced in [Apt, Blair and Walker, 19871. tion. Represent a general clause as a rule:
Default logic
Let U be the collection of atoms under considera-41, . . . , Qn : T i , . . . rm P The translation t r ( P ) of a program P is the set of translations of its individual clauses.
The following result was proved in [Bidoit and Froixdevaux, 19881 and [Marek and Truszczyliski, 198 
Logic programming with classical negation
We now discuss so-called "logic programming with classical negation" of [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 19891 as a chapter in the theory of nonmonotonic formal systems.
Recall the basic notions introduced in [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 19891 Gelfond and Lifschitz then introduce general rules. Since the negation used in literals is not the "negationas-failure" of general logic programming, Gelfond and Lifschitz introduce another negation symbol "not" and a general logic clause with classical negation in the form:
, not(cm)
Then the answer set for a set P of clauses of this form is introduced by merging the operational procedure for the construction of stable models for a program (as introduced in [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 19881 ) with the procedure above. They define the answer set for a program with classical negation as follows:
Let M C Lit and P be ageneral program. Define P I M as a collection of clauses lacking not and obtained as follows:
(1) If a clause C contains a substring not(a) and a E M , then eliminate C altogether.
(2) In remaining clauses eliminate all substrings of form not(a). The resulting program P I M lacks the symbol not, so the answer set is well defined. Let M' be the answer set for P I M . We call M an answer set for P precisely when M' = M .
Gelfond and Lifschitz give a computational procedure for finding such answer sets, and subsequently reduce computing them to computing default logic extensions. We show that the construction of Gelfond and Lifschitz is faithfully represented within nonmonotonic rule systems. Define U to be L i t , and translate 
(5)
By expanding our set of rules N ( S ) , we can ensure that extensions correspond to proper symmetric marriages. That is, suppose that S =< B, G , K > is a society in which every boy knows only finitely many girls, and every girl knows only finitely many boys, and there is a symmetric marriage for S. Let U be defined as before. In addition to all rules of form (4) and (5), add a set of rules for each g E G. 
Complementary Subspaces of Vector Spaces
where x E Vb0 and SO is the largest s such that W, = (0) and ws+1 # (0). Then E is an extension of < U , N >=<
Uw(V,),Nw(V,)
> if and only if E is a subspace s v c h l h a t E $ W = V , a n d f o r a l l s < l , E , @ W , =
v, .
Extensions of Highly Recursive Rule Systems
In this section we define the notions of recursive and highly recursive nonmonotonic rule systems. We show that the problem of finding an extension in a highly recursive nonmonotonic rule system is effectively equivalent to finding an infinite path through a recursive binary tree. That is, we prove that given any highly recursive nonmonotonic rule system S =< U, N >, there is a recursive binary tree Ts and an effective one-to-one degree-preserving correspondence between the set of extensions of S and the set of infinite paths through Ts. Conversely, we show that given any recursive binary tree T , there is a highly recursive nonmonotonic rule system ST =< U T , NT > such that there is an effective one-to-one degree preserving correspondence between the set of infinite paths through T and the set of extensions of ST. It follows from the result of [Jockusch and Soare, 1972a ] that any recursively bounded IIY-class can be coded as the set of infinite paths through a recursive binary tree.
We transfer all the results about degrees of elements of recursively bounded IIY-classes to results about degrees of extensions in highly recursive nonmonotonic rule systems.
Paths through the Binary Trees and Extensions
To make the program outlined above precise, we first need some notation. Let w = (0, 1 , 2 , . . .} denote natural numbers and let <, >: w x w + w be some fixed one-to-one and onto recursive pairing function such that the projection functions 7r1 and 7r2 defined by XI(< x , y >) = I and 7rz(< x , y >) = y are also recursive. We extend our pairing function to code n- It is then the case that if A is a recursively bounded IIY-class, then A = P ( T ) for some highly recursive tree T E w C w , see [Jockusch and Soare, 1972a] . We note that if T is a tree contained in 2 C w , then P ( T ) is a collection of (0, 1)-valued functions and by identifying each f E P ( T ) with the set A f , A/ = {z: f (z) =. The formula 'pm is called the conclusion of p and denoted cln(p), the set Gm is called suppori of p and denoted supp(p).
The idea behind this concept is this: we really care about schemata for proofs, and one scheme of proof is vm good for a large collection of sets S, as long as they satisfy natural constraints. A proof scheme brings all these constraints together.
A proof scheme with the conclusion cp may include a number of rules irrelevant to the enterprise of deriving cp. There is a natural preordering + on proof schemes namely we say that p + p l if every rule appearing in p appears in p l as well. The relation + is not a partial ordering, and it is not a partial ordering if we restrict ourselves to proof schemes with a fixed conclusion 'p. Yet it is a well-founded relation, namely, for every proof scheme p there exists a proof scheme p i such for every pa, if p2 + p l then p1 4 pa. Moreover we can, if desired, request the conclusion of pl to be the same as p .
Moreover, setting p -p l E ( p 4 pl A p l + p ) we see that -is an equivalence relation and that its cosets are finite.
We say that the system < U , N > is locally finite if for every 'p E U there are finitely many *-minimal proof schemes with conclusion 'p. This concept is motivated by the fact that for locally finite systems for every cp there is a finite set of derivations Dr,+,, such that all the derivations of 'p are inessential extensions of derivations in in Dr,. Finally, we say that S is highly recursive if S is recursive, locally finite, and the map 'p I-+ c a n ( D r , ) is partial recursive, that is there exists an effective procedure which, given any 'p E U , produces a canonical index of the set of all +-minimal proof schemes with conclusion 'p. Also, we let E(S) denote the set of extensions of S.
Formally, when we say that there is an effective, one-to-one degree preserving correspondence between the set of extensions f ( S ) of a highly recursive nonmonotonic rule system S =< U , N > and the set of infinite paths P ( T ) through a highly recursive tree T , we mean that there are indices el and e2 of oracle Turing machines such that (i) ~J~~P ( T ) {~I }~~( ' ) = Ef E z(S),
(ii) ~J E E E ( s ) {~~}~ = f E E P ( T ) , and -
(iii) vfEP(T)vEEE(S)({el }gr(f)
-E if and only if { e 2 } E = f ) .
where { e } B denotes the function computed by the eth oracle machine with oracle B. Also, we write { e } B = A for a set A if { e } B is a characteristic function of A , and for function f : w --t w , gr(f) = {< x , f(z) >: z E U}. As concerns our conditions (i)-(iii), the first ones say that the branches of the tree T uniformly produce extensions (via an algorithm with the index e l ) , and that extensions of S uniformly produce branches of the tree T (via an algorithm with the index e2). The condition (iii) asserts that if { e l } g r ( f ) = Er then f is Turing equivalent to Er. In what follows, we shall not explicitely construct the indices el and e2 xn but it will be clear that such indices exist in each case. 
f(S) and P(T).
We get several immediate consequences about the degrees of extensions in highly recursive nonmonotonic rule systems from Theorem 5.1, based on results of [Jockusch and Soare, 1972al (ii) If S has only finitely many extensions, then every extension E of S is recursive.
Highly Recursive Marriage Problems
We say that a society S =< B , G , I< > in which every boy knows only finitely many girls is highly recursive if B and G are recursive subsets of w , K is a recursive relation, and there is a recursive procedure which, given any b E B , produces a canonical index of the finite set of girls known by b. If, in addition, each girl g E G knows only finitely many boys in B and there is a recursive procedure which, given any g E G , produces a canonical index of the finite set of boys known by by 9 , then we say that S is symmetrically highly recursive. Now, it is easy to see that if S is a highly recursive society and we identify Mbg with its
recursive nonmonotonic rule system. However, as it stands, < U ( S ) , N ( S ) > is not highly recursive rule system because the rules of the form (5) which allow for infinitely many minimal derivations of p.
However, if S is symmetrically highly recursive, then a slight modification of rules (5) will produce a highly recursive nonmonotonic rule system with the same extensions. That is, suppose S =< B , G , I< > is a symmetrically highly recursive society which has a proper marriage. Let U ( S ) = { M b g : b E B,g E G , and < b,g >E IC} as before. Now suppose 6 1 # b2 are boys which know the same girl. Then clearly one of boys bl and b2 must know at least two girls, since otherwise there can be no proper marriage for S. Since S is highly recursive, B2 = {b E B: b knows at least two girls } is a recursive set. Now consider rules of the form for all bl, b2 E B , g E G where b3 = m a z ( { b l , b2} n B2) and 9' # 9 .
Let U ( S ) = U ( S ) and N ( S ) consists of rules of the form (4) and (13). Then 
The same modification can be applied to the symmetric marriage problem. That is, suppose that S =< B , G , IC > is a symmetrically highly recursive society.
Let Usym(S) = U ( S ) , and Nsym(S) be all rules of form (4), (13), and (5) All of the above results follow from Theorem 5.5 plus the corresponding results for recursively bounded IIY-classes due to Soare [1972a] [1972b] except of Corollary 5.10 which follows from the corresponding result for recursively bounded 11 :-classes due to Jockusch and McLaughlin [1969] . Now we give a construction of a rule system < U, N > whose extensions directly code infinite paths through a binary tree T and provide us with a more direct route to Theorem 5.5 which avoids using the results of [Manaster and Rosenstein, 19721 or [Remmel, 19861. Example 5.1 Paths through binary trees.
Let 7 be a recursive binary tree contained in 2<". Let U ( 7 ) = { P i , Pj:i E w } . Our idea is to have a set 7r such that I ?r n { P i , E } I= 1 for all i correspond to a path f T : w -+ w through the complete binary tree B, = 2<, where
-Pi E 7~ says that we branch right at level i, and Pi E ?r says that we branch left at the level i. Now, for any node U =< u(O), ..., u(n) >, let Fu = {,(PO), . . . , u ( P n ) } where We say that U =< u(O), ..., u(n) > is a terminal node of 7 if both < u(O), ..., u(n),O >e 7
Then we consider the following set of rules.
< a(O), . . . ,a(n), 1 >e 7 .
-for all U which are terminal nodes of 7 where U(Pn) = Pn (b) U ( PO) 9.. .,U( P n ): P n for all U which are terminal nodes of 7 where a(P,) = Let N ( 7 ) consists of all rules of the form (14) and (15). Then we have the following (if we identify Pi with its code 2i and 7, with its code 2i + 1).
Pn .
Theorem 5.12 Let 7 C 2cw be a recursive tree.
(i) < U ( 7 ) , N ( 7 ) > is a highly recursive nonmonotonic rule system and (iz) E is an extension o f < U ( 7 ) , N ( 7 ) > if and only if the map f E : w + w defined by
is an infinite path through 7.
Given Theorems 5.1 and 5.5, it is natural to ask if there are analogous results for locally finite nonmonotonic rule systems which are recursive, but not highly recursive. The answer is "yes". That is, we say that a tree T C_ wCw is highly recursive in 0' if T is recursive in o' , T is finitely branching, and there is a procedure which is recursive in 0' and which given any node r] E T will produce the canonical index of the set of immediate successors of r] in T . Then the analogues of Theorems 5.1 and 5.5 hold for recursive nonmonotonic rule systems if we replace highly recursive trees by trees which are highly recursive in 0'.
Moreover, by relativization to the code of the collection of rules < U , N > we are able to deal with the case of arbitrary locally finite nonmonotonic system S. The distinction between the form of function that computes the canonical index of the collection of prooof schemes for elements of U remains, if this function is recursive in (the code of) < U , N >, then the tree I whose branches code extensions of < U , N > is recursive in (the code of) < U , N >. Otherwise it is recursive in its jump.
These results will be proved in a subsequent paper.
5.4
The results of Sections 5. 
The object p is denoted by c ( r ) . One needs to notice that when the theory < D, W > is finite, our description of it, via the translation to nonmonotonic rule systems is finitary. Also, the characterization formulas pr+ are finitary. The reason for this is that, in addition to rules in D , we also have all the rules of logic. The schemes of proof of logic result in infinitely many rules which are, however, monotonic. There are infinitely many proof schemes, but the collection of formulas of form k ( p ) is finite anyway! This fact results in the finitary algorithm described in [Marek and Nerode, 19901. Our translation of propositional logic programs as rule systems provides us with an infinitary characterization of stable models of logic programs. The reason this is important is that the definition of stable model of logic program, as introduced in [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 19881 , is purely operational. Let P be a logic program, II its propositional version, that is the collection of all the Herbrand substitutions of P. Let 
Conclusion
In a sequel we deal with rule systems containing variables in the rules. We shall deal with predicate logics. We shall prove results related to the properties of recursive systems that are not necessarily highly recursive. We also explore connections with Lwl,w.
